Introduction
The proliferation of mobile devices and location systems such as GPS and phone-based technologies has led to an increasing interest in developing and deploying locationbased applications. Examples of such applications include tourist information systems, "Buddy Services" that inform friends when they are physically close to each other and location-based advertising in which marketing information is sent to users when they enter specific geographic areas. Such applications raise serious privacy issues that must be addressed to satisfy both public concern and the need for compliance with current legislation. An important first step in protecting users' location privacy is making them aware of requests for this information from third-parties such as location-based advertisers: one could envisage a system in which users must explicitly agree to the release of their location information by clicking "ok" on a dialog box each time a new request for this information is made. However, such a system would clearly be at odds with the vision of Calm Technology proposed by Weiser [1] . More specifically, Weiser argues that for technology to become truly ubiquitous it should be designed to merge into the background such that it becomes a part of the fabric of everyday life. Thus the goal is to minimize the intrusiveness of technology and the demands it makes of the user. The problem that we address in this paper is how to deal with these two conflicting requirements, i.e. the need for users to maintain control of their location privacy and the need to minimize the demands made of these same users.
Our system was motivated by an extremely practical problem, i.e. how to protect location information gathered by our groups' location tracking systems. In order to support the wide variety of location based applications being developed in our laboratories we have created a unifying location service called LocServ [2] . LocServ is a middleware service that lies between location based applications and location tracking technologies. The primary purpose of LocServ is to unify location tracking technologies so that a location based application can make use of multiple positioning systems. In essence, users of LocServ can specify a location query using any of the symbolic or geometric location models that LocServ understands (new models can easily be added) and queries can be resolved using any number of underlying technologies. Thus, LocServ allows applications to be written in a way that is entirely independent of the underlying location technology that they use. Given the existence of a service such as LocServ we required a mechanism for controlling access to users' location information without requiring repeated user intervention.
In this paper we describe the beginnings of an extensible system for enabling privacy in environments that support location-based applications. The system employs the same basic concepts used in P3P [3] and pawS [4] , using machine readable privacy policies and user preferences to automate the process of deciding whether or not a particular piece of location information can be released to a third-party. However, our system architecture and preference language are significantly different to those used in P3P and pawS, reflecting the differences in deployment domain.
Requirements
To illustrate the requirements for a privacy policy system for location-based applications, consider the following scenario:
Our example user, Sally, carries with her a mobile phone that enables her to be accurately located whenever she is carrying the device. During The above scenario clearly illustrates the richness of constraints (or preferences) that a typical user might wish to apply to control the distribution of their location information. In our example, Sally restricts access to her information in a number of ways:
Organization In most cases Sally restricts access to her location information to a number of specific organizations (e.g. the company she works for or the providers of the "Find a Friend" service). Service While Sally generally restricts access to her location to companies she knows, she is also happy to accept certain types of information (e.g. information bulletins) from companies that she has no prior connection with. Time Sally controls access to her location information by her employer based on the time of day -she has different policies for work-days, weekends and evenings. Location Sally is happy for the FunTime amusement park to track her location while she is in the theme park but not when she leaves, hence their ability to obtain location information is in turn dependent on her location and the relationship between the company requesting the information and the physical space. As a general rule we note that people already expect that the owner of a physical space has the ability to track movements within their space and hence this type of relationship must be supported. Request Type Sally restricts the type of query that an application can issue to obtain her location information. For example, while in the amusement park Sally is happy to provide an anonymized trace of her location -she does not want the trace tied back to her identity. As a further example, while Sally is happy to tell the "Find a Friend" service when she is within a specified distance of one of her friends, she does not want to tell them her exact location. Context Sally uses her calender (or more specifically her work schedule) to control access to her location information by her employer. Other forms of contextual information such as whether or not she is alone could easily form part of her preferences.
The above list is not intended to be an exhaustive set of requirements for privacy preferences in ubiquitous computing environments. Indeed, one easily imagine additional constraints such as "information about a child's location can only be released when it is with its parents". In addition to meeting the requirements described above we were conscious of two additional constraints, i.e. the need to comply with the existing and emerging legislation in the area and, as discussed previously, the desire to minimize user interaction when dealing with requests for location information.
Compliance with current legislation Currently there are two important pieces of legislation relating to the general issue of privacy, the US Privacy Act of 1974 and the European Union's Directive 95/46/EC [5] . The US Privacy Act of 1974 was created specifically for information privacy. It gave legal substance to the idea of fair information practices including: openness and transparency, e.g. no secret record keeping, individual participation, collection limitation, use limitation, reasonable security, and accountability. The European Union's Directive handles protection and movement of personal data. The directive has two important areas of impact. Firstly, it limits the transfer of data to non-European Union countries to only those that are deemed as having an adequate level of privacy protection. Secondly, it requires explicit consent, i.e. a user must unambiguously give consent to the collection of information. In common with Langheinrich [4] we recognize the difficulties of designing a system that guarantees compliance with such laws and hence have chosen to develop an architecture based on trust and respect: producers and consumers both state their policies with regards to information collection and distribution and these statements are assumed to be accurate. We rely on digital signatures to prove authenticity of these statements and would expect that legislation such as that described above could be used to hold people accountable for violating their stated privacy policies.
Minimization of Interaction
Our system is designed to support the full range of location based applications, from interactive user solicited services such as context-aware tour guides through to unsolicited location based advertising messages. We were acutely aware of the need to design a system that required minimal on-going user involvement -hence conforming to Weiser's vision of calm technology. In particular, we did not want the user's attention to be repeatedly focused upon evaluating the acceptability of an application's request for location information. Instead we wanted to push the acceptance/rejection of a request to the periphery and only bring a request to the user's attention when they had not established a policy to handle the request. This was a very important design consideration due to the volume of requests that each individual user could be subjected to during any particular day. It is also important because we believe that a user's privacy should be protected by default: the architecture is designed so that a user is electing to share certain information by establishing a policy rather than electing to protect specific information.
In this paper we describe an extensible system that supports such a diverse set of requirements and provides users with fine-grained control over the release of their location information. More specifically, we offer a general framework of components that enables users to apply general policies to control distribution of their information based on factors such as the nature of the organization or application that is requesting the data together with its information retention and distribution policies and, crucially, a mechanism for consulting external entities such as application specific modules before releasing information. In this way arbitrarily complex policies for restricting information dissemination can be used: enabling factors such as activity, ownership of spaces or rich contextual cues to be used in the decision making process.
Protecting Privacy for Users of Location-based Applications

Architectural Overview
The overall architecture of our system is shown in Figure 1 . We assume the existence of a location server (such as LocServ [2] ) that answers queries from applications concerning the location of users. These queries can be broadly classified into the following types:
Requests for user location These requests are for the location of a specific user or users, identified by their unique identifiers.
Enumeration requests These requests return lists of users located within specific locations, expressed either in terms of geographic or symbolic attributes. Asynchronous requests Applications can register for events such as when users enter or leave specific areas or when proximity relationships are satisfied (e.g. tell me when Sally and Bob are within half a mile of each other).
The location server abstracts over the underlying positioning technologies used to derive location, such as GPS and Active Bat systems, and provides a common API to applications. Users subscribe to one or more location servers and register their privacy requirements with each server. These requirements take the form of system components called validators. Given a request for location information and a privacy policy provided by the application, it is the responsibility of the validators to determine whether the information requested may be released and, if so, whether any special constraints should be imposed (e.g. reducing the accuracy of the location data provided). Users register a single validator with a location server for each of their identifiers. However, validators may call other validators to help in the decision making process and thus multiple validators may be used to determine the correct response in any given case.
We assume that trusted relationships exist between users, their location tracking systems, validators and the location server.
Fig. 1. Overall System Architecture
Applications wishing to obtain information about a user's location issue a query to the location server. This query is accompanied by a statement of their privacy policy, expressed using the syntax described in section 3.2. The location server will consult the relevant validators before deciding whether or not to release the information. If necessary, the location server can require applications to sign their privacy statements and, similarly, applications can require that the location server returns a signed agreement to these practices.
It should be noted that both the location server and the validators are abstract entities that can be realized in a number of ways, including as integrated components of a single location technology or, as in our system, where the location server is a selfcontained middleware service with associated internal and external validators providing a balance of efficiency and extensibility. Thus the location server in our architecture simply represents the point at which privacy statements from client applications are checked by validators against privacy preferences expressed by users or administrators of the system.
Expressing Privacy Policies
Third party applications seeking a user's location first choose a location server responsible for the user (typically determined by the contact details available to the application: given a phone number for example, the application might contact the location server of the user's mobile telephone provider). The application contacts the location server and sends both a query and a statement of its privacy policy. The query should be expressed in a format understood by the location server in question -in our system this is a proprietary LocServ format but other formats such as that proposed by the Location Interoperability Forum [6] could be used for other types of location server. In order to support automatic checking of privacy policies it is clearly necessary to agree on a common scheme for describing these policies. Our approach is to adopt the policy specification language proposed as part of the W3C's P3P specification [3] . This XML-based language is designed to provide a machine readable form of the privacy policies currently found on web sites. It provides a wide range of constructs allowing, for example, the description of the types of information that will be collected, who will have access to this information and how long it will be retained.
In order to address the requirements of location based applications we have found it necessary to make a number of extensions to the P3P policy specification language. We discuss each of these extensions in the following list. Readers unfamiliar with P3P can simply view the list below as a summary of the main differences between privacy policies that relate to web browsing/e-commerce and those that relate to location based applications.
ENTITY The P3P ENTITY tag provides a mechanism for describing the business and contact details of the organisation providing web based services. In our context, entities must now represent arbitrary third party applications requesting location information. We have augmented the ENTITY tag with two further fields: TYPE and CERT (optional). TYPE may be one of 'non-profit', 'profit' or 'government' and is designed to allow automatic identification and filtering of course grained classes of application (e.g. restrictions to be placed on all non-profit services). The CERT field is provided to allow certification schemes to be introduced (a user might wish to only utilise services certified by a particular set of trusted organisations or authorities). PURPOSE P3P's PURPOSE tag clearly reflects the specification's orientation towards e-commerce and web interactions (representing such intentions as telemarketing and tailoring of web pages). In our scheme we choose a new set of broad classifications that we believe more accurately reflect the intentions of location based service providers: 'safety', 'entertainment', 'marketing', 'information', 'service-delivery', 'statistical-analysis' and 'security'. Differentiating two of these categories further: 'safety' identifies services that aim to improve the safety of the user (e.g. warnings of danger in particular areas or in support of the emergency services) whereas 'security' applications refer to those where the user is being tracked for security purposes (i.e. surveillance). Like its parent, P3P, our schema allows for arbitrary user extensions. REQUEST-INITIATION In P3P based web interactions the user always initiates a dialogue by visiting a particular web site and following certain hyperlinks. In contrast, in our model applications may request information from the user's Location Service at any time. We have added a a new tag 'REQUEST-INITIATION' and partitioned interactions into two classes: 'unsolicited' and 'solicited'. Unsolicited interactions are those not explicitly or consciously triggered by the user (e.g. initiated speculatively as a user wanders into a particular region or proximity). Solicited interactions are assumed to have been explicitly triggered by some out-of-band action initiated by the user (e.g. requesting a taxi to their current location). The solicited tag may be accompanied by arbitrary user data (as proof ) that may be used to link the request back to the instigating action. Note that the REQUEST-INITIATION tag also provides a convenient mechanism to allow the user to block unwanted requests from unsolicited services.
In contrast to P3P we do not require privacy policies to specify the data to be collected since this can be determined from the associated query. Since our policy language is simply a set of extensions to the current P3P language it is possible for existing P3P policy specifications to be used in our system. However, such policies are unlikely to be applicable since they will typically contain a specification of data items collected during web-based activities (that will not be appropriate for the queries issued to a location service) and will not contain sufficient details of the application purpose to allow most users to determine whether they wish to accept or reject the request.
Validators and Expressing User Preferences
The process of checking the acceptability of privacy policies is performed by system components called validators. As stated previously, validators are simply computational entities that accept as parameters a request for information and an associated policy and determine whether or not the request should be accepted. As part of this decision making process validators can call other validators, thus allowing the creation of networks of components that collectively determine whether information should be released to the application. Examples of potential validator components include:
User Confirmation A simple validator component could pass the responsibility for decision making onto the user by displaying a dialog box containing a summary of the requesting application's privacy policy and information requirements. While such a validator does not begin to address the desire for calm technology it is a useful component at the end of a chain of other validators when the system has been unable to decide automatically whether or not to accept a request. User Data and Context Validators can be constructed that base their decision on data from user applications such as calenders or system components such as activity monitors. More generally, validators provide a mechanism for including contextual information (beyond location) in the decision making process. External Services We have already identified that establishing ownership of a physical space is important in determining the acceptability of requests. Clearly users are not going to know in advance the ownership of an arbitrary set of physical spaces. Hence, we anticipate that external validation services will be developed that resolve such issues. Other examples of external services include verification of a thirdparty's reputation and checking listings of "spam requests".
In addition, there is a requirement for general purpose validators that are able to make decisions based on information supplied in the privacy policies attached to requests. These general purpose validators could be tailored using a range of mechanisms including preference languages such as APPEL [7] or more general purpose rule based languages. Our own experiments suggest that a simple scheme that allows matching of the basic attributes specifiable in privacy policies (e.g. entity, purpose etc.) and the additional features presented below provides sufficient flexibility to express many common privacy preferences.
STATEMENT The user may define a policy statement for each type of request supported by the LocServ API, choosing to accept the request either unconditionally or to impose certain time, location or accuracy constraints. For example, a user might choose to accept a request to enumerate all users within a given locale (providing course grained identification), but might reject a direct request for their precise location. LIMIT-TIME We allow users to associate time bounds with preferences. For example, a user may wish to impose a constraint such that their employer can only access the user's location during working hours. LIMIT-LOCATION Users can restrict the collection of their information to specified geographic areas. For example, the user may be happy for a shopping mall to track their location while the user is in the mall, but would presumably wish this surveillance to stop once they had left the premises. VALIDATOR Users may specify one or more URIs to other, external, policy validators. Each validator receives a copy of the third party request and the accompanying privacy policy statement. The validator may implement any arbitrary policy on behalf of the user, returning accept or reject to the location server evaluating the policy. Currently, we allow for validators to be combined in sequences using simple logical operators. QOS Our system incorporates a placeholder for the specification of Quality of Service (QoS) in user preferences. This could be used to, for example, limit the accuracy or certainty with which a user can be located.
The provision of time and location constraints are particularly important in order to support ongoing location operations that yield events to a third-party over time. It is important to note that users can register any components that provide an appropriate interface as validators. Thus we do not expect there to be just one type of validator or even one mechanism for specifying preferences to general-purpose validators. Hence we are not concerned with the standardization of languages for expressing preferences such as APPEL.
Anonymity
In section 2 we highlighted the requirement for users to be able to provide anonymous location information, e.g. Sally was happy for the FunTime owners to trace her movements but not for them to be able to identify her. Clearly, producing anonymous location information is a non-trivial task and there have been a number of recent research papers that have attempted to address this problem (e.g. [8] ). In our current system we take an approach that relies on users having multiple identifiers. More specifically, when a location request is received the user's validators can decide whether to return the user's long-term identifier, a short-term identifier associated with the user or a new randomly generated identifier. New identifiers are created with either new validators and associated rule-sets or they inherit the user's original configuration.
To understand how this system works consider the case when Sally enters the FunTime amusement park. The owners have registered with Sally's Location Service that they wish to receive an event whenever someone enters this area. Since Sally is happy to provide them with the information that someone has entered the space but not her identity, her validator ensures that FunTime is provided with a new identifier in response to this query. Of course such an identifier can be reused by FunTime to obtain Sally's location during her visit but the identifier will eventually expire and will have no link back to Sally's long-term identifier.
Such a scheme does not, of course, provide complete anonymity since it may well be possible for applications to deduce the mapping between temporary and permanent identifiers by observing patterns of movement. Protecting against this type of attack is outside the scope of this work.
The Role of the User
Validators simply automate the process of checking privacy policies against user preferences, whether or not these preferences are an integral part of the validator or passed to the validator as a parameter, for example, in the form of a configuration script. Clearly we do not expect end-users to write their own validator components or even produce configuration scripts unaided. Instead, we envisage a world in which service providers and other trusted organizations provide users with default validators that they can use. For cases where non-standard preferences are required, simple tools could help users create appropriate configurations. To aid us in understanding this process we have created a number of "wizards" that ask users a series of questions about their location information privacy preferences and then generates appropriate configuration scripts.
Similarly, we would not expect individual application writers to author their own privacy policies to accompany queries. Rather, we would expect these to be written as part of a company's general policy making process in the same way as current human readable web privacy statements. This is a view shared by the developers of systems such as P3P that attempt to provide similar forms of support for privacy management.
Example Scenarios
In this section we re-visit our original scenario presented in section 2 and illustrate how this can be realised using our scheme. We divide the scenario into six separate interactions.
1. Sally's employer accessing her location during office hours. 2. Sally's employer accessing her location out of office hours but when she is on-call. 3. Sally visiting a restaurant and allowing them to locate her. 4. Sally calling a taxi to take her home and the taxi company obtaining her location information. 5. Sally visiting the FunTime amusement park. 6. Sally using services such as "Find a Friend" and local information providers.
Sally's Validators and Preferences
Sally has a simple configuration consisting of three validators in total. The first is a general purpose validator that uses a configuration script to determine whether requests can be accepted, declined or require additional validators to be used in the decision making process. The remaining two validators are used to access Sally's calender and determine ownership of physical spaces and are called as required by the first validator. Table 1 illustrates a rule-base for a general purpose validator that would meet Sally's requirements. Each row corresponds to a rule that is used to allow access to her location information and each column corresponds to either a parameter to be matched in the requesting application's privacy policy or a statement of action to be taken, e.g. to consult an external validator. Note that a number of the columns in this table relate to parameters found in conventional P3P policies as detailed in the P3P specification document [3] .
Rules 1 and 2 are used to control access to Sally's location information by her Employer. Rule 1 allows the company to obtain any information it wants on Sally's whereabouts during office hours. Rule 2 supplements Rule 1 by ensuring that, when a request is received that is not accepted by Rule 1, Sally's calender is checked to see if she is on-call and hence the request should be accepted.
Rule 3 allows access to Sally's location by both the FunTime amusement park and the restaurant Sally is visiting. This rule simply states that Sally's location can be determined by anyone who owns the physical space in which Sally is located. However, this information is presented in the form of a pseudo-identifier, thus partially concealing Sally's true identity.
Rule 4 allows the taxi company Sally uses to obtain her location information when she has requested a service from them. The rule specifies that the taxi company can only obtain her location information as a result of Sally explicitly requesting the service and clearly some form of information exchange would be required to ensure that this condition is met. Rules 5 and 6 restrict access to on the basis of company and service type and company name and query type respectively. 
Privacy Policies of Applications Requesting Location Information
Each of the applications that request location information for Sally is required to present a statement of its privacy policy along with its query. It is this privacy policy that is checked by the validators. Figure 2 shows an example privacy policy for Sally's employer while Figure 3 shows a policy for a local travel information service Sally uses. It should be noted that both of these policies contain information specified using the basic P3P vocabulary as well as the extensions we have discussed in this paper. Policies for the other applications take similar forms.
Related Work
Despite its obvious importance, there has been relatively little systems-oriented research into privacy protection in ubiquitous computing systems. In this section we consider those systems that have been developed and that directly informed our work.
Geopriv
The IETF Geopriv working group have identified a need to "securely gather and transfer location information for location services, while at the same time protecting the privacy of the individuals involved" [9] . The IETF Draft produced in November 2002
<POLICY name="Employer"> <ENTITY> <DATA-GROUP> <DATA ref="#business.name">SallysEmployer.com</DATA> <DATA ref="#business.address">1 The Grindstone</DATA> </DATA-GROUP> <TYPE><profit></TYPE> <CERT><certified companies 6790></CERT> </ENTITY> <DISPUTES-GROUP> <DISPUTES resolution-type="independent" service="http://www.SallysEmployer.com" verification="SallysEmployer.com" short-description="For disputes please contact the management. <REMEDIES><correct/></REMEDIES> </DISPUTES> </DISPUTES-GROUP> <STATEMENT> <CONSEQUENCE><consequence.data></CONSEQUENCE> <PURPOSE><other-purpose></PURPOSE> <RECIPIENT><ours></RECIPIENT> <RETENTION><indefinitely></RETENTION> <REQUEST-INITIATION><unsolicited><REQUEST-INITIATION> </STATEMENT> </POLICY>
Fig. 2. Sally's Employer Policy
<POLICY name="Employer"> <ENTITY> <DATA-GROUP> <DATA ref="#business.name">Tucson Happy-Travel Service</DATA> <DATA ref="#business.address">Tucson, AZ</DATA> </DATA-GROUP> <TYPE><non-profit></TYPE> <CERT><certified companies 6380></CERT> </ENTITY> <DISPUTES-GROUP> <DISPUTES resolution-type="independent" service="http://www.thts.com" verification="thts.com" short-description="For disputes please contact the national travel service arbitration scheme."> <REMEDIES><correct/></REMEDIES> </DISPUTES> </DISPUTES-GROUP> <STATEMENT> <CONSEQUENCE><consequence.data></CONSEQUENCE> <PURPOSE><info></PURPOSE> <RECIPIENT><ours></RECIPIENT> <RETENTION><no-retention></RETENTION> <REQUEST-INITIATION><unsolicited><REQUEST-INITIATION> </STATEMENT> </POLICY> Fig. 3 . A Local Travel Information Service describes one possible approach to securely transferring location information and associated privacy data. In essence, the scheme involves creating Location Objects that encapsulate user location data and associated privacy requirements. Thus, a system that produces location data would supply that location data to client applications in the form of Location Objects. Central to this scheme is the notion that these Location Objects can be made tamper resistent, e.g. by digitally signing them. Such an approach clearly has much in common with digital rights management schemes designed to protect digital media from illegal re-distribution.
At present the Geopriv working group's proposals and the scheme described in this paper are largely orthogonal. While we focus on defining the means by which information release is managed and the nature of the privacy rules and preferences used to control this release, these issues are not currently addressed in Geopriv. Hence, a subset of the rule sets and overall policy architecture described in this paper could be used as the "privacy-enabling information" [9] stored in a Location Object since Geopriv will, in our opinion, require a mechanism for expressing preferences that has the same requirements for flexibility and extensibility as our system. The coupling of data and privacy meta-data proposed in Geopriv clearly offers benefits in terms of accountability when location information has been passed between multiple applications. However, the practicality of such a system has yet to be determined.
P3P and APPEL
P3P [3] and APPEL [7] together provide a mechanism to help web sites announce their privacy practices while allowing users to automate the process of deciding whether to accept or reject these practices. P3P specifies an architecture consisting of user agents, privacy reference files and privacy policies. When a user accesses a web site the user's "user agent" obtains a privacy reference file for that web site using one of a number of well defined mechanisms. This privacy reference file contains a list of mappings between URIs for the site's web resources and URIs of their associated privacy policies. Thus the web agent can ensure that the appropriate privacy policy is downloaded, parsed and compared with the user's preferences prior to accessing a web resource. In addition to this architectural framework P3P also specifies the language used to express privacy policies. Privacy preferences that are used to configure user agents may be expressed in a number of forms with APPEL being suggested as a common mechanism to ensure that preferences may be re-used by different user agents. It should be noted that P3P does not attempt to enforce or ensure privacy , e.g. by cryptographic or anonymization techniques, instead it relies on social and legal pressures to ensure organizations comply with their stated policies.
pawS : A Privacy Awareness System
pawS [4] is a privacy awareness system designed to protect privacy in a ubiquitous computing environment. In common with P3P, the idea behind the system is to provide people with tools that enable them to protect their own personal privacy and to help others respect that privacy -it is a system based on respect and social and legal norms rather than rigorous technical protection of private information. In pawS, when users enter an environment where data collection is taking place a privacy beacon announces the privacy policies of each service in the environment. These policies, expressed in the same language as P3P policies, are checked by a user's privacy proxy (corresponding to user-agents in P3P) against the user's pre-defined privacy preferences expressed in APPEL. If an agreement is reached information collection can proceed and services can be utilized. If no agreement is reached the user is notified and can take appropriate action such as not using the service in question or, in extreme cases, leaving the area in which the information collection is taking place.
Analysis
P3P and pawS provide good starting points for an investigation into privacy enabling schemes in ubiquitous computing. In particular, significant work has gone into attempting to ensure that P3P is compatible with existing and emerging legislation in the area of information protection and privacy. However, neither of these systems can adequately support the scenarios described in section 2. For example, the P3P architecture is designed specifically to support web interactions typically involving electronic commerce and business applications. Thus the mechanisms for obtaining reference files and policy documents are tightly coupled with web usage models, protocols and deployment architectures. Moreover, the policy language, while extensible, currently contains constructs for expressing information collection and management policies appropriate for protecting information disclosed when involved in web browsing and on-line transactions initiated by the user. In our approach we must be able to protect the user in situations where an arbitrary third-party location-based application requires information from the user's current location server.
Similarly, while APPEL can be seen to be a good starting point for expressing privacy preferences, we believe that it is insufficient to support the richness of expression we wish to achieve for our user's preferences. In our approach, we have chosen to provide an extensible mechanism based on external software components that allow the expression of preferences with all the semantic richness of a general computational language. We believe that this depth of expression is essential to allow the forms of complex expression necessary to enable autonomous evaluation of user criteria in real application domains.
Our system also differs from pawS, P3P and Geopriv in terms of its association between preferences, services and data. Geopriv has a fairly simple model in which privacy requirements are associated with user data. However, this makes it difficult to capture privacy requirements that span multiple data items or that do not readily fit into Location Objects. For example, in Geopriv it would be difficult to specify that an application can know if two people were co-located but not their individual locations. In comparing our system to pawS it is important to recognize that there is a fundamental difference in philosophy behind the two systems. Specifically, pawS attempts to provide users with the option to protect their privacy at the moment of information capture, typically when a user accesses a service or when they enter a new geographic space. In contrast, our system attempts to provide privacy checks at the moment of information release, i.e. when an application makes a solicited or unsolicited request for location information. Both approaches have their place: for example, our system does not provide a mechanism for determining that a particular physical environment is capturing information about a user (the high-tech equivalent of a sign saying "security cameras are in use in this store"). Similarly, pawS does not provide an elegant way to announce the intentions of services that proactively seek user information on a global scale.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented a privacy policy system designed specifically to protect personal location information. The major challenge for designers in this space is addressing the need to protect privacy without requiring undue user intervention. This problem is compounded by the diversity of application and user requirements with respect to privacy management. To address these requirements our system uses machine readable privacy policies that can be checked automatically on the user's behalf. The system is designed to be extremely extensible, allowing the inclusion of external computational components as part of the privacy management decision making process. Our system borrows from P3P, APPEL and the pawS architecture and employs the same basic concept of machine readable privacy polices. These policies can be automatically checked by system components and the user only notified when a decision on information release is not possible. In this way we can reduce the load on the user associated with processing requests for their location information. Our system extends the basic framework used in P3P and pawS to include support for server initiated information requests, privacy preferences based on time and location and the inclusion of additional computational components in the privacy decision making process.
In common with P3P/APPEL and pawS, we rely on external enforcement through legal recourse rather than attempting to electronically guarantee privacy. This is based on our observation that managing the redistribution of information is known to be extremely hard -as witnessed by on-going efforts in the area of digital-rights management. In this field scientists have large files with which to work and consequently are able to embed devices such as watermarks or use cryptographic techniques to restrict access. For privacy information this will not typically be the case, and hence we do not believe that guarantees of personal privacy will be possible in the near future. However, we do believe that our system has real potential to solve the immediate problem of creating a framework for discussing and controlling information collection and distribution in pervasive computing environments.
